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The Court of Justice of the European Union provides further guidance on the interplay 
between copyright and design law in works of applied art - Judgment of the Court (Third 
Chamber) of 12 September 2019 Cofemel – Sociedade de Vestuário SA v G-Star Raw CV 
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Supremo Tribunal de Justiça Case C-683/17  
Introduction 
The overlap between copyright and design rights which can occur in relation to works of 
applied art, such as fashion items, furniture or jewellery, is a pertinent issue within many 
jurisdictions. Copyright and designs law regimes follow different rationales and have different 
requirements for protection which can lead to unintended consequences where an overlap 
occurs. The situation within European Union (“EU”) Intellectual Property (“IP”) Law is 
exacerbated since its Member States have diverging approaches on how to regulate this 
potential overlap of IP rights in works of applied art. Some States allow an overlap, while 
others apply different standards for copyright in works of applied art in order to minimise the 
overlap of rights.1  
European Union law in the form of Article 17 of the Design Directive2 or its counterpart in 
Article 96(2) of the Community Design Regulation3 appears to permit these divergent 
approaches. Both provisions foresee that an overlap is possible and that the relevant 
requirements, including the necessary level of originality required for copyright protection in 
designs, shall be determined by the law of each Member. Diverging approaches, however, have 
the potential to undermine the objective of harmonising the law within the EU.4 The case law 
of the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) has limited these discrepancies. Most 
notably, it held in the Flos decision5 that Member States cannot disallow copyright protection 
for designs which would meet the requirements of copyright protection. In the underlying 
decision, the CJEU had yet another opportunity to develop its jurisprudence on this issue. But 
the Court achieved much more than that as it also developed its jurisprudence on copyright 
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Background 
The case is based on a preliminary reference from the Supreme Court of Portugal, the Supremo 
Tribunal de Justiça, and relates to various designs of clothing. G-Star Raw CV (“G-Star”) 
designs, produces and markets clothing, such as jeans, T-shirts and sweatshirts under various 
brand names, such as G-Star Denim Raw, GS-Raw, G-Raw and Raw. Cofemel, the defendant 
in the underlying litigation in Portugal is a company incorporated under Portuguese law and is 
in the same field of business as G-Star. It designs, produces and sells models of jeans, sweat 
and T-shirts under the brand name Tiffosi. In the first instance proceedings, G-Star alleged that 
Cofemel had marketed models of jeans, T-shirts and sweatshirts which would be identical or 
similar to the designs of G-Star’s Arc and Rowdy clothing items. G-Star argued that they were 
original intellectual creations and, as such, design works protected by copyright. Therefore, it 
sought a court order to stop Cofemel from infringing its copyright and any act of unfair 
competition, and compensation for damage resulting from the infringement. The court agreed 
partially with G-Star which led to Cofmel appealing the decision before the Tribunal da 
Relação de Lisboa (Lisbon Court of Appeal, Portugal), which confirmed the decision of the 
first instance court. 
On appeal by Cofemel, the Portuguese Supreme Court found that the models of G-Star clothing 
which had been copied by Cofemel were either created by designers employed by G-Star, or 
by such designers who had contractually transferred their copyrights to G-Star. The court also 
found that the pieces of clothing in question were the result of concepts and manufacturing 
processes which would be regarded as innovative in the world of fashion. Thirdly, it found that 
the models in question possessed specific characteristics (i.e. their three-dimensional shapes, 
the positioning of certain elements, their assembly and colour schemes) which had partly been 
incorporated in Cofemel's clothing designs. In this context, the Supreme Court questioned the 
meaning and scope of Article 2 (1) (i) of the Portuguese Código do Direito de Autor e dos 
Direitos Conexos (“Code of Copyright and Related Rights”).7 The Court found that the 
provisions would include works of applied art, industrial designs and works of design within 
the list of works protected by copyright where they constitute an artistic creation. The provision 
would, however, not specify the degree of originality required for such works to be susceptible 
for copyright protection. 
Hence, the Supreme Court decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions 
to the CJEU: 
1)    Does the interpretation by the Court of Justice of the European Union of Article 
2(a) of Directive 2001/29/EC 1 preclude national legislation — in the present case, the 
provision in Article 2(1)(i) of the Código de Direitos de Autor e Direitos Conexos 
(CDADC) — which confers copyright protection on works of applied art, industrial 
designs and works of design which, in addition to the utilitarian purpose they serve, 
create their own visual and distinctive effect from an aesthetic point of view, their 
originality being the fundamental criterion which governs the grant of protection in the 
area of copyright? 
 
7 The provisions states: 
Spiritual creations from the fields of literature, science and art, regardless of gender, the form of 
expression, the quality, the mode of communication and the goal include, in particular: ... 
 
i) works of applied art, industrial designs, and design works that constitute an artistic creation, 
irrespective of the protection of the industrial property of these works. 
 
2)    Does the interpretation by the Court of Justice of the European Union of Article 
2(a) of Directive 2001/29/EC preclude national legislation — in the present case, the 
provision in Article 2(1)(i) of the CDADC — which confers copyright protection on 
works of applied art, industrial designs and works of design if, in the light of a 
particularly rigorous assessment of their artistic character, and taking account the 
dominant views in cultural and institutional circles, they qualify as an ‘artistic creation’ 
or ‘work of art’? 
The Advocate General’s opinion 
Advocate General (“AG”) Maciej Szpunar handed down his opinion on 2 May 2019. He found 
that both questions of the referring court boiled down to the single issue of whether the CJEU’s 
interpretation of Article 2 (a) of the InfoSoc Directive means that protection of industrial 
designs under copyright law is only possible if the design has an artistic character which goes 
beyond what is normally required of other categories of copyright work. He then provided 
some context in relation to a possible overprotection of works of applied art. Such works would 
entail both a utilitarian function and an aesthetic function and could therefore be based on the 
rationales of design and copyright protection. However, an inflation of copyright could restrain 
free economic competition. Therefore, some Member States have developed schemes to 
reserve copyright protection for designs with a high artistic value, such as the doctrine of 
"scindibilità" in Italian law or the "Stufentheorie" in German law.8  
The AG then placed his focus on an analysis of the concept of “work” in EU copyright law.9 
He noted that Article 2 (a) of the InfoSoc Directive did not provide a definition of the term 
“work” but that this omission was difficult to sustain given that the concept of “work” is a 
cornerstone of any copyright system. The lack of a definition within the InfoSoc Directive and 
that fact that the Directive does not refer to the law of a Member State  defining a “work” would 
make the term an autonomous concept of EU law developed by the Court’s jurisprudence. 
which This means that the “author’s own intellectual creation” requirement is the core concept 
of the term “work” since the Court’s Infopaq decision.10 In other words, originality exists where 
the work reflects the author’s personality by means of an expression of their creative abilities 
in taking free creative choices. Conversely, originality does not exist where technical 
functionality would restrict creative choices of authors. In addition, the object of copyright 
protection must be able to be identified with sufficient precision and objectivity.   
The AG then expanded this analysis in relation to the jurisprudence on designs.11 He rejected 
the submission of the Czech Government that the definition of work did not expand to such 
categories of works of copyright which are not subject to EU law. It needs to be said here that 
the EU has legislated on various areas of copyright law in the form of Directives. These pieces 
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of legislation, e.g. the Database12, Term13 and Computer Programs Directives14, do provide 
specific definitions (i.e. the “author’s own intellectual creation” - test) of originality within 
their texts.15 The question therefore remains whether the EU’s standard would encompass such 
works which are not specifically regulated under EU law. The AG acknowledged that the 
Court’s definition of originality first developed in Infopaq was applied to such works which 
would be subject to EU law, such as photographs.16 The Court, however, referred to its Infopaq 
standard in these decisions rather than the definition found within the specific legislation. This, 
in the opinion of the AG, rendered the concept of originality applicable to all works. In addition, 
the requirement to uniform application of the InfoSoc Directive throughout the territory of the 
EU made this approach mandatory since “any disparity between the internal laws of the 
Member States in the scope of copyright protection would undermine this uniform 
application.”17 The AG also rejected the argument by the Czech Government that the “own 
intellectual creation” test was part of  assessing whether there is a work. This approach would 
allow Member States to apply stricter standards for works of applied art. He, however, 
counterargued that the criterion of “the author’s own intellectual creation”, or originality, is the 
highest standard Member States can impose on works being eligible for copyright protection.18 
The AG then discussed his findings in context with the rules set out in Article 17 of the Design 
Directive and Article 96 (2) of the Community Design Regulation which provide for  an overlap 
of rights.19 The Governments of Italy, Czechia and the United Kingdom argued that these 
provisions would permit Member States to regulate the conditions for copyright protection for 
designs and would constitute lex specialis in relation to the InfoSoc Directive. The AG 
disagreed with these points. He argued that Article 17 of the Design Directive only concerned 
registered designs and therefore only gave Member States competence to regulate with respect 
to such designs as being protectable by copyright. Most designs in the EU are, however, be 
unregistered designs. This makes Article 96(2) of the Community Design Regulation relevant. 
While this provision then assumedly provides Member States with a wide discretion ex ante, 
this would be dependent on the lack of EU harmonisation as stipulated by Recital 32 of that 
Regulation. The AG stated that this discretion had been lost with the corpus of law provided 
by the InfoSoc Directive. He also found that the jurisprudence of the CJEU in Flos would   
support this view. There, the Court of Justice held that Member States had lost the ability to 
determine the scope and conditions of copyright protection for designs where this concerned 
the duration of this protection since this had been harmonised by the previous Term Directive.20 
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This reasoning could now be applied in the context of the InfoSoc Directive which has 
harmonised the economic rights of authors, along with the concept of “work”. Since a uniform 
application of these concepts is paramount, the rules of Article 17 of the Design Directive, and 
by analogy, Article 96 (2) of the Community Design Regulation cannot be interpreted as 
derogating from those of the InfoSoc Directive or any other EU text regulating copyright law. 
The AG therefore concluded that Article 2 (a) of Directive 2001/29, as interpreted by the Court, 
would preclude industrial designs from being  protected by copyright only on the condition that 
they have an artistic character which goes beyond what is normally required of other categories 
of works. Szpunar provided some context to his analysis to allay fears that his conclusions 
would lead to the overprotection of works of applied art.21 According to the AG, the rigorous 
application of copyright could alleviate this problem. While not posing a very high bar, the 
criterion of originality serves as a threshold against overprotection. It requires that the author’s 
efforts must be free and creative which would exclude from copyright protection designs which 
are solutions solely dictated by their technical result or works lacking any creativity. In 
addition, the idea-expression dichotomy, mitigates against  the anti-competitive effect of 
copyright protection of works of applied art, such as the T-shirts, sweatshirts and jeans, which 
are the subject of this case. 
The decision 
The CJEU handed down its decision on 12 September 2019 (which is still not available in 
English at the time of writing). The Court first emphasised that the term “work” was the key 
issue in this decision. It held that the term “work” would constitute an autonomous notion of 
EU law and includes two elements: namely, that the object in question is original in the sense 
of the author’s own intellectual creation, and secondly, that the classification as a work is 
limited to expressions of such creativity..22 With regard to the element of originality, the Court 
reiterated that this requirement would only be met where the object in question reflects the 
personality of the author through the expression of free and creative decisions. This excludes 
objects which are constrained by technical considerations and would therefore not provide 
much scope for creative choices.23 The second element, the Court found that the work must be 
expressed in a manner which makes it identifiable with sufficient precision and objectivity by 
referring to its Levola Hengelo decision which discussed the protectability of the scent of 
cheese.24 The latter element was dictated by the need to clearly and precisely identify the 
protected subject matter, and to avoid any subjectivity which would undermine legal 
certainty.25 The proposed approach excludes the different treatment of works on the basis of 
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After a long discussion on the possibility of an  overlap of rights, the Court found that copyright 
protection is available where the objects in question fulfil the abovementioned criteria of 
“originality” and “work”.26 While an overlap of rights still remains possible following this 
approach, it will only occur in limited cases. However, it held that the requirement of some 
form of aesthetic value for the design to be capable of  copyright protection, as stipulated in 
the law of some Member States, is not compatible with the requirement of objectivity as 
required under EU law since this would entail a subjective assessment. The Court therefore 
concluded that Article 2 (a) of the InfoSoc Directive must be interpreted as precluding a 
national law from conferring copyright protection on designs on the ground that, beyond their 
utilitarian purpose, they create a distinct and noticeable visual effect from the aesthetic point 
of view.27   
Comment 
The decision is an important milestone in assessing the relationship between copyright and 
designs in works of applied art. It scrutinised the relationship of Article 17 of the Design 
Directive and Article 96 (2) of the Community Design Regulation with the ever-growing 
jurisprudence of the CJEU on copyright law. Its conclusion is not surprising when looking at 
the ways the Court has decided previous cases and disallows any national approaches which 
would treat works of applied art differently to other works. The decision in Cofemel is also an 
important development in the Court’s jurisprudence on copyright subsistence. It grounds the 
“author’s own intellectual creation” test as the sole yardstick for originality and arguably sets 
it within the continental European tradition on this requirement. Another important takeaway 
of the decision relates to where technical constraints limit the ability of authors to apply their 
creativity. This indicates that such  work does not involve originality and therefore poses 
functionality as the antithesis of originality. The Court also reiterated its assessment of the term 
“work” along with the necessity for it to be objective and clear, hence emulating trade mark 
terminology it elaborated on in the Levola decision. This removes any subjectivity as to 
whether the object in question is of aesthetic quality which is prone to be based on the 
observer’s opinion. Regrettably, the Court did not elaborate on the issue of overprotection of 
works of applied art to the extent the AG did. The issue of overprotection was already raised 
by the Opinion of the European Copyright Society on the Cofemel reference.28 The AG’s 
arguments on how to deploy the toolbox of copyright law requirements serves as a useful guide 
on how to avoid overprotection of works of applied art. 
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